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Abstract—This paper presents Ariadne, a tool for engineering
topology aware adaptive security for cyber-physical systems. It
allows security software engineers to model security requirements
together with the topology of the operational environment. This
model is then used at runtime to perform speculative threat anal-
ysis to reason about the consequences that topological changes
arising from the movement of agents and assets can have on the
satisfaction of security requirements. Our tool also identifies an
adaptation strategy that applies security controls when necessary
to prevent potential security requirements violations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ubiquitous computing is resulting in a proliferation of
cyber-physical systems (CPS) that host or manage valuable
physical and digital assets. These assets can be harmed by
malicious agents through both cyber-enabled or physically-
enabled attacks, particularly ones that exploit the often ignored
interplay between the cyber and physical world. For example,
cyber-enabled physical attacks can occur when physical assets
are cyber-controlled, such as software that controls access to
buildings or some of their areas. Similarly, physically-enabled
cyber attacks can occur when physical access to assets or
locations enables cyber attacks. For example, access of an
agent to a physical area from which it is possible to connect
to a wifi network, enables the agent to eavesdrop on other
agents’ information transmitted over the network.
In previous work [1], [2] we advocated that the topology
of cyber and physical spaces -their structure in terms of key
elements and their relationships- can provide a system with
awareness of security relevant contextual characteristics. These
include the location of assets being protected and the security
controls that should be enacted in their proximity. Moreover,
the location of potentially malicious agents can increase the
threat of harm to the assets in their vicinity. Discovering
threats arising from the interplay of cyber and physical spaces
suggests the need for an explicit representation of the topology
of such spaces including properties such as structure and
connectivity. Changes in the topology triggered by movements
of objects or agents in the physical or cyber space can also
change the attack surface dynamically, and introduce new
threats that are difficult to identify at design time. Existing
approaches [3] do not discover and counter security breaches
at runtime determined by unexpected topological changes of
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the cyber-physical space; an adaptive security approach to
discover and mitigate possible security threats is needed.
This paper presents Ariadne, a tool for engineering topol-
ogy aware adaptive security for cyber-physical systems. This
prototype tool demonstration embodies our approach in the
context of known unknowns, where although change primitives
are well understood by the security engineer, their effect on
security requirements at runtime cannot be predicted. Ariadne
allows defining and maintaining a live model of the topology
of cyber and physical spaces and performs speculative threat
analysis and planning, to respectively discover and counter
security threats at runtime. Potential users are security software
engineers who have to manually configure security controls in
cyber-physical environments, such as smart buildings. Ariadne
is demonstrated through two adaptive security scenarios set
in a smart building, involving respectively a physical and
a cyber threat both enabled by changes in the topology
of the physical space. The rest of the paper illustrates the
steps necessary to engineer topology aware adaptive security,
describes the demonstration scenarios and explains how the
functionalities provided by Ariadne can identify and prevent
identified security threats.
II. DEMONSTRATION SCENARIOS
As an example consider a floor plan of a modern building,
comprising a corridor, from which a server room and a wifi
area are accessible. The floor plan is illustrated in Figure 1.
Wireless network access is provided for the agents located in
the wifi area. The server room contains valuable assets, such as
a printer, a server and a cloudlet, provisioning virtual machines
upon request to users connected to the wireless network.
Communication with virtual machines allocated in the cloudlet
can also be encrypted if necessary. Agents can roam into the
building, while also carrying their mobile phones; access to
areas is regulated by authenticating on room doors.
As security requirements we consider that external visitors
should always be accompanied in the server room, in order to
preserve the integrity of assets inside, such as the server (SR1).
Furthermore, information transmitted by an agent to one of
the VMs allocated on the cloudlet should never be received
by others (SR2). Enabling predetermined security controls to
satisfy the aforementioned security requirements might not be
effective as topological changes arising from the movement
of agents and assets can still lead to security breaches. For
example, preventing visitors from accessing the server room
might no longer be effective when for example, a visitor
requires access to the server room to fix the printer. Similarly,
always enabling encryption on mobile devices communicating
with the cloudlet is not efficient as they can run out battery.
Fig. 1: Floor plan of a building
For the first demo scenario, we consider a visiting tech-
nician, Mallory, who requires access to the server room to
repair the printer. If she is unaccompanied, requirement SR1 is
violated. To prevent this security breach several actions can be
performed while Mallory is in the corridor. For example, she
can be forbidden from accessing the server room until another
employee (e.g., Bob) has accessed the server room. For the
second scenario, we assumed an employee (e.g., Bob) is in
the wifi area and communicates with one of the VMs created
on the local cloudlet. If another employee (e.g., Eve) moves to
the wifi area while carrying a mobile device and connects to
the wireless network, she can eavesdrop on Bob’s information
transmitted over the network. To prevent this security breach
Eve can be forbidden from accessing the wifi area or from
connecting to the network; alternatively encrypted information
transmissions can be enabled.
III. TOPOLOGY AWARE ADAPTIVE SECURITY
Figure 2 provides an overview of our topology aware
adaptive security approach. Adaptation builds on a live rep-
resentation of the topology of the cyber and physical space
characterising a system operational environment modelled us-
ing Bigraphical Reactive Systems (BRS) [4]. Adaptive security
is achieved by implementing the activities of the MAPE
(Monitoring, Analysis, Planning and Execution) loop. Events
generated from the cyber and physical space indicate the
execution of agents’ actions.
During monitoring, events indicating the execution of
agents’ actions are received. During speculative threat anal-
ysis, future configurations of the topology of the cyber and
physical space that can be achieved when agents perform
actions are looked ahead up to a certain number of steps.
Violations of security requirements that can arise from future
topological configurations are subsequently identified through
model checking. The analysis requires as input the updated
model of the cyber and physical space and the security re-
quirements. After analysis terminates, a set of action execution






















Fig. 2: Topology aware adaptive security
Action execution traces leading to violations are used during
planning to determine an adaptation strategy aiming to pre-
vent future violations of security requirements. An adaptation
strategy can forbid the execution of some actions that lead
to a violation or can enforce additional actions to restore
a violated security requirement. Selection among more than
one actions that can be enforced depends on their cost which
is predetermined by the security software engineer. During
execution, the adaptation strategy is recognised and applied
on the real cyber physical system. This activity receives as
input the events indicating the execution of agents’ actions,
identifies when a specific state in the adaptation strategy is
reached, and enforces an adaptation action if necessary.
IV. MODELLING CYBER AND PHYSICAL SPACES
Ariadne allows security software engineers to manually
define a topological model of the operational environment,
a set of reaction rules, and the security requirements. The
model of the topology is expressed using bigraphs [4], which
is a formalism consisting of two graphs. A place graph is
a forest, capturing the notion of containment and nesting of
physical and digital locations. A link graph is a hypergraph
composed of the same set of nodes of the place graph and
a set of edges each linking any number of nodes; this graph
represents generic many-to-many relationships among nodes,
such as communication among digital objects and agents.
P.Q Nesting (P contains Q)
$i Site numbered i
K[a, b].P Node associated with control K having ports
a and b. The node contains P.
P ‖ Q Juxtaposition of roots






The bigraph representation used for the scope of this tool
is found in Formulae 1a-1e, and is used to represent the floor
plan of the demonstrating example, as shown in Listing 1. P
and Q are bigraphs. The containment relationship is expressed
in Formula 1a; for example, Agents eve and bob contain a
mobile phone they carry. Additionally, bigraphs can contain
sites (Formula 1b) that can be used to denote placeholders.
Controls are names that define a node’s type; each node control
can be associated with a number of named ports. If a single
instance node of that type exists in the bigraph, the control also
uniquely identifies that node (e.g., for the building). Otherwise,
we use port names as a way to uniquely identify a node (e.g.,
for rooms, visitors, or other agents). Since the underlying link
graph is a hypergraph, multiple different ports may be related
to a single name; ports of different nodes occuring in a formula
with the same name, are considered connected. For example,
Phones can have port wlink indicating they are connected
to the wireless network (note the Wifi router having also a
port named wlink). Bigraphs can be contained in roots that
delimit different hierarchical structures. In Formula 1d, P and
Q are different roots; they can reside in different parts of the
containment hierarchy. Conversely, two bigraphs can be placed
at the same hierarchical level , as shown in Formula 1e. For
example, nodes representing the printer and the server are co-
located in the Room identified by port serverroom.
Listing 1: Representation of the example floor plan
Bu i l d i n g . ( Room [ c o r r i d o r ] . (
Room [ s e r v e r r oom ] . ( P r i n t e r | Se r v e r | C l o ud l e t [ l ] )
| V i s i t o r [ ma l l o r y ] | Agent [ eve ] . ( Phone [− ] )
| Agent [ bob ] . ( Phone [ − ] . ( I n f o [ bob ] ) ) |
Room [ w i f i a r e a ] . ( W i f i [ w l ink , l ] ) ) )
BRS extend bigraphs by representing the dynamic behavior
of the operational environment as a set of reaction rules. These
rules have the general form of R → R′, where R is a redex
and R′ is a reactum; both the redex and reactum are bigraphs.
In particular, if a part of a bigraph matches a reaction redex,
it can be replaced with the reactum, in a fashion similar to
graph rewriting.
TABLE I. BRS REACTION RULES
Reaction rule
enter room
Agent [ x ] . ( $0 ) | Room [ r ] . $1 | $2 −>
Room [ r ] . ( $1 | Agent [ x ] . $0 ) | $2
connect wifi
Wi f i [ w l ink , l ] . $1 | Agent [ x ] . Phone [ − ] . $2 | $0 −>
Wi f i [ w l ink , l ] . $1 | Agent [ x ] . Phone [ w l i n k ] . $2 | $0
create vm
Wi f i [ w l ink , l ] . $4 | | Agent [ x ] . Phone [w ] . $2 | |
C l o ud l e t [ l ] . $3 −>
Agent [ x ] . Phone [ w l i n k ] . $2 | |
Wi f i [ w l ink , l ] . $4 | | C l o ud l e t [ l ] . (VM[ x ] | $3 )
info tx
Agent [ x ] . Phone [w ] . I n f o [ x ] | |
Agent [ b ] . Phone [ w l i n k ] . $5 | | Wi f i [ w l ink , l ] | |
C l o ud l e t [ l ] . (VM[ x ] | $3 ) −>
Agent [ b ] . Phone [ w l i n k ] . ( I n f o [ x ] | $5 )
| | Agent [ x ] . Phone [ w l i n k ] | | Wi f i [ w l ink , l ]
| | C l o ud l e t [ l ] . (VM[ x ] . ( I n f o [ x ] ) | $3 )
Table I represents some of the reaction rules modeled for
our demonstration scenario. Rule enter room represents an
Agent’s ability to enter a room; if an Agent x is at the same
hierarchical level with Room r, she can access it, while all
the other elements contained either in the Agent x, around
or in the adjacent Room r are not modified. In the same
fashion, connection to the wifi network is modelled by joining
the mobile phone carried by an Agent to port wlink already
connected to the Wifi router. Similarly, rule create vm
expresses the capability of an Agent containing a Phone
which is connected to the Wifi (i.e. it has port wlink), to
allocate a VM on the Cloudlet. Information transmission
is modelled as the exchange of a token; for unencrypted
transmissions reaction rule info tx models the fact that this
information token may end up also on another Agent’s phone
connected on the Wifi network if encryption is not enabled;
conversely if encryption is used, information is regarded as
transmitted securely to the recipient.
Security requirements are represented as parametric match-
ing properties, themselves as bigraphs. To match, two bigraphs
have to exhibit the same structure as well as the same link
connections. The security requirements of the demo scenario
are represented in Table II. For example, the physical integrity
(SR1) of assets placed in the server room is violated when a
V isitor is located inside without an accompanying Agent;
a visitor is allowed alone only in the corridor. Moreover,
the requirement corresponding to a violation of an Agent’s
confidentiality (SR2) can be represented as an Agent whose
Phone appears to carry an information token associated with
a different Agent.
TABLE II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Name Requirement
Integrity
Room [ c o r r i d o r ] . ( V i s i t o r [ x ] | $0 ) | $1 OR
Room [ s e r v e r r oom ] . (
V i s i t o r [ x ] | Agent [ y ] | $2 ) | $3
Confidentiality Agent [ eve ] . Phone [ w l i n k ] . (
I n f o [ bob ] | $0 ) | $1
V. A WALK THROUGH ARIADNE
Ariadne maintains an updated representation of the topology
at runtime. It receives events corresponding to the execution
of actions in the environment; each event is associated with
a reaction rule in the BRS model. Events indicate the action
that occured, its enactor agent(s) and a subject if applicable;
e.g. 〈bob, enter room,wifi area〉 indicates that Bob has
accessed the wifi area. The model of the cyber-physical space
maintained at runtime is updated, reflecting the application of
reaction rules associated with the monitored events.
The updated BRS model is subsequently used to perform
speculative threat analysis. To achieve this aim, a Labelled
Transition System (LTS) [5] is generated representing possible
future topological configurations of the cyber-physical space.
This exhaustive state generation process is bounded by a
specific look-ahead depth, indicating the maximum number
of subsequent actions that will be considered during model
checking; such a look-ahead depth can be configured by the
security software engineer depending on runtime performance
constraints. Each LTS state represents a different topological
configuration of the cyber-physical space, whereas each LTS
transition connects two configurations and indicates that the
Fig. 3: Screen of Ariadne runtime showing a fragment of an adaptation strategy
target state is reachable from the starting one, when a specific
reaction rule is executed. Different sequences of transitions
can lead to the same topological configuration.
The tool presented in this paper uses a set-theoretic ap-
proach to generate new states in a Bigraphical Reactive Sys-
tem, which then maps to a LTS and proceeds to perform model
checking. At each state generated, the security requirements
specification is checked. Should a violation occur, the com-
plete counterexample is considered. For example, as shown in
Figure 3, if Bob enters the wifi area and Mallory accesses the
server room, requirement SR1 is violated (red state) as Mallory
is unaccompanied. A set of immediate successor states of the
violating one in which the security property is restored are
also identified (green states). For example, for the scenario
where Mallory enters the server room unaccompanied, if
subsequently Eve enters the server room or Mallory is forced
to exit, integrity is restored again.
The execution traces generated by model checking are used
to compute an adaptation strategy valid for a specific number
of subsequent topological configurations of the cyber-physical
space. Such a strategy forbids the execution of actions that
lead to the violation of a security requirement, or alternatively
perhaps enforces specific actions in order to mitigate it. For
this purpose a state machine is generated that recognises the
transitions of the counterexamples received as input from the
analysis, as these are the ones that lead to violations. This state
machine activates appropriate adaptation actions if necessary.
A screenshot of the runtime environment showing a limited
fraction of the adaptation strategy generated is displayed in
Figure 3. In the upper left part, various runtime information
of the prototype tool is provided; these include the current
bigraphical model, the last event received and the actions
taken at the current state (shown in yellow). Additionally,
the lookahead depth used for the analysis of the state space
and the events the system is waiting for to progress the
adaptation strategy. If we consider the state reached when
Bob enters the wifi area, connects to the network and creates
a VM, if subsequently Eve enters the room, and connects
to the network and Bob transmits information to one of his
allocated VMs, a state is reached where confidentiality is
violated. Indeed, Bob’s information is transmitted insecurely
and therefore it is considered as also received by Eve. To avoid
such a violation unencrypted transmission is forbidden after
Eve connects to the wifi network. Decisions on which actions
can and are in fact enforced or forbidden are predefined by
the security software engineer depending on the application
domain. For example, if the system is unable to enforce
encrypted connections but could control access to rooms, Eve
could be prevented from entering the wifi area instead.
A. Demonstration Testbed
The test-bed1 we developed to reproduce the cyber-physical
system of the demonstration scenario includes an OpenStack
installation simulating a cloudlet and exposing a service for
dynamically creating, deleting and using VMs, a wifi access
point (OpenWrt), NFC readers associated with the doors of
the wifi area and the server room, and smartphones used to
connect to the wireless network. An Android application was
also developed to create/delete VMs and issue requests to them
from mobile devices through the wifi network. This application
also supports conditional encryption of messages exchanged
between the mobile phone and the cloudlet. Monitored events
transmitted to Ariadne included: access to a room by an
agent, connection/disconnection of a mobile device to/from
the wireless network, provisioning/deprovisioning VMs on the
cloudlet, and message exchanges between a mobile phone and
a VM. As adaptation actions we allowed the possibility to
forbid an agent from accessing a room or disable unencrypted
communications between mobile phones and the cloudlet.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Pasquale, C. Ghezzi, C. Menghi, C. Tsigkanos, and B. Nuseibeh,
“Topology Aware Adaptive Security,” in SEAMS, 2014, pp. 43–48.
[2] C. Tsigkanos, L. Pasquale, C. Menghi, C. Ghezzi, and B. Nuseibeh, “En-
gineering Topology Aware Adaptive Security: Preventing Requirements
Violations at Runtime,” in RE, 2014.
[3] L. Pasquale and C. Tsigkanos, “A review of formalisms and analysis
techniques for cyber-physical systems,” Tech. Rep. [Online]. Available:
http://home.deib.polimi.it/tsigkanos/techrep/cps.pdf
[4] R. Milner, The Space and Motion of Communicating Agents. Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
[5] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D. A. Peled, Model checking. MIT
press, 1999.
1A video demonstration can be found at http://youtu.be/Z8ODO96jGMw
